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Abstract 
In this paper we describe a set of changes in the management of 
the European Monetary System (mostly strict enforcement of 
mechanisms already present in the 1978 Resolution of the European 
Council establishing the EMS> that would enable the member Central 
Banks to maintain discretionary power over the timing of 
realignments of their exchange rate parities. We think that this 
is an important issue now that restrictions to capital movements, 
believed to have limited the amount of speculation in exchange 
rate markets, are progressively abolished. We do not propose a 
system that would, alone, remove the need for periodical 
readjustments of the EMS exchange rate parity. We suggests, 
rather, a cooperative policy which could prevent such realignments 
to be forced by speculators. 
1 
A common feature to fi};ed and semi-fi}{ed e}tchange i-ate 
systems is the problem of the realignments of the parities. As 
long as the economic structures of the countries joining a fixed 
exchange rate system differ in any relevant way, or as long as 
national and fiscal policies lack sufficient coordination, 
periodical readjustments of the parities are unavoidable. 
The question that we war1t to address here is how mor1etary 
authorities can choose the timing of these realignments. The 
existing speculative attack literature (e.g. Krugman (1979>, Flood 
and Garber(1984)) stresses that ,if monetary policies are 
committed to targets other than the exchange rate, then the timing 
of realignments is not a matter of choice for the monetary 
In this case, the timing of a devaluation or 
revaluation is determined by the behavior of profit maximizing 
speculatc,rs. This lack c,f control may be undesirable for several 
reasons. From a political point of view, there are periods which 
are more favorable than others for a devaluation (revaluation). 
The monetai-y authc,ri ties may wish to avoid to be forced by 
speculatcq-s to devalue (revalue) durir1g "bad times". Moreover, 
whenever a devaluation is triggered by a speculative attack, the 
profit deriving from the revaluation of the international reserves 
will accrue to the small group of speculators which succeeded in 
gaining possession of the central bank~s foreign assets. From a 
2 
public finance point c,f view, however, it is preferable that such 
capital gain be received by the public authorities, so that it 
could be used to finance their expenditure. 
It has been argued that during the functioning of the EMS, 
the monetary authorities of countries involved in realignments 
were sometimes successful in choosing the timing of the 
devaluation, and in retaining possession of their international 
It is believed that this discretionary ability is due 
to the widespread use of capital controls which make speculation 
infeasible under many circumstances. However, capital controls 
can be very costly, since they prevent an efficient allocation of 
resources among the European Community. For this reason, the 
community members are progressively dismantling these restrictions 
on international trade. 
The question now is whether and how the monetary authorities 
can maintain some degree of freedom in exchange rate decisions, 
once the capital controls are completely removed. II1 this note we 
will argue that this could be achieved by expanding and enforcing 
mechanisms which are already pr·escribed in the original documer1t 
establishing the EMS. We want to stress, however, that we are not 
suggesting that realignments can or should be eliminated 
altogether= Our goal here is much more limited. Given that 
realignments are bound to occur, we want to illustrate mechanisms 
through which the monetary authorities may retain some control 
over their timing. 
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The remainder of this note is organized as follows= In 
section two, we describe the essential elements triggering a 
speculative attacks. In section three, itJe present our idea for 
preventing speculative attack from occurriI1g. In section four, we 
discuss the issue of the credibility of the mechanism we propose. 
Section five concludes. 
2. E~~ential FeaturPs of a SperulativP Attack 
The basic idea underlying the speculative attack literature 
is that the monetary authorities will be forced to devalue as soon 
as it becomes profitable to run their international reserves. 
This occurs as soon as the exchange rate expected to prevail right 
after the speculative attack (the shadow exchange rate> exceeds 
the given parity. For simplicity, in the following we consider 
the case of a currency facing a possible devaluation, and we 
assume that, if this happens, a flexible exchange rate regime will 
be established. 1 The shadow exchange rate depends crucially on 
the level of high powered money expected to be in circulation 
after the speculati·,,,e attack. Keeping other things constant, 2 a 
1 None c,f the results would change if we considered also the 
possibility of a revaluation, or if we assumed that a new fixed 
e::,{change rate would be established after the speculative attack. 
For more details, see Grilli (1986). 
2 In general, the shadow exchange rate depends on other variables 
like domestic output, foreign prices and interest rates (see for 
example Flood and Garber (1984)). In this analysis we consider 
these variables as exogenously given, and concentrate our 
attention on the crucial policy variable, i.e the monetary base. 
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higher level c,f pc,st-attack monetary base implies a higher (i.e. 
more depreciated) exchange rate: 
The necessary condition for a speculative attack is: 
where e is the official (fixed) parity. Avoiding a speculative 
attack, therefore, implies avoiding a post attack monetary base 
"'* that exceeds some crucial threshold< M ). In order to determine 
the post-attack monetary base it is useful to consider the asset 
side of the central bank balance sheet. In each point in time t, 
the mc,neta1-y base can be divided intc, twc, cc,mpc,nents: ( i > the part 
which is backed by domestic securities (DCt>, and (ii) the part 
which is backed by international reserves <eRt). In the 
post-attack flexible exchange rate regime, foreign reserves are 
fixed at the level <R> at which the monetary authority abandoned 
the defense of the parity. Note that~ is, within certain limits, 
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a matter of choice of the monetary authorities and is the crucial 
policy variable in our proposal. The post-attack (shadow) money 
"' supply at time tis therefore given by Mt= DCt + eR = Note that, 
for given R, a large increase in DCt may trigger a speculative 
attack. 
3. Borrowing International ReservP~ to Avoid SpPrulativP Attarks. 
Note first that R does not need to be positive ■ By bon-owing 
international reserves, the domestic monetary authorities can make 
R negative. Indeed, the monetary authorities do not need to 
actually bc,rrow to reduce R. All that is needed is that they have 
the potential ability to do so, and that speculators expect them 
to follow such a policy whenever the exchange rate is under 
pressure.a Suppose that the monetary authorities have access to a 
potentially unlimited line of credit in foreign currency, and that 
they are e;-:pected to use such credit whenever attacked by 
"' speculators. This implies that R = -m, so that et would be 
always below any positive e. In fact, the line of credit does not 
need to be infinite in size. It is sufficient (but not necessary> 
Since this 
The issue of the credibility of such a policy is a crucial one 
and will be addressed in the next section. 
3 
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implies eR = - DCt, the central bank would be able to set the 
post attack money supply at zero, making the existence of an 
excess supply of domestic currency impossible for any positive 
level of the exchange rate= In practice, the necessary line of 
credit will be much smaller thane: so that the following analysis 
has to be considered just as a useful benchmark. If the monetai-y 
authorities could borrow Bt,* then any attempt to force a 
devaluation by running the central bank~s international reserves 
would be unsuccessful. Rational speculators, realizing this, 
would never attempt an attack: de facto the line of credit will 
never be used!4 
In this way, tempoi-ary crises generated by unavoidable, 
transitory excesses of monetary base (for example for budget 
financing needs) will have nc, effect on the exchange i-ate. On the 
other hand, if the shock to money creation is permanent, a 
devaluation is unavoidable in the long run. However, the monetary 
authorities can avoid a speculative attack by threatening to use 
the line of credit whenever attacked, and chDDse the time of the 
devaluation in a way perceived as random by the speculators. It 
may seem that during the period of randomization the speculators 
may want to run the international reserves of the central bank 
The fact that bc,rn:rwing intei-national reserves may prevent the 
collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime during temporary crises 
has been already pointed out by Grilli (1986) and Buiter (1986). 
4 
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anyway, and convert domestic assets into foreign assets in order 
to profit from a possible devaluation. However, speculators will 
be willing to hold domestic assets, since they are compensated for 
the risk of a devaluation by an higher domestic interest rate, as 
implied by the open interest parity condition. 
A necessary condition for this policy to be credible is that 
the domestic monetary authorities could feasibly borrow Bt.* Will 
the foreign authorities be willing to provide such considerable 
lines of credit? We know that in equilibrium the lending will 
never take place, so that it will not inflict any cost on the 
lending central banks. However, if the speculators do not believe 
the policy is feasible and run the domestic international 
reserves, the loans will have to be made. Nonetheless, once 
again, the operation will not impose any cost on the foreign 
authorities. In fact, once the loans are made, and the 
speculators realize that the policy is indeed pursued and the 
parity will not collapse, they will stop the attack and surrender 
the foreign currency to the domestic central bank. The domestic 
monetary authorities, in turn, will satisfy the loan by returning 
the foreign currency to their foreign counterpart. The whole 
operation will simply involve the creation and the (almost> 
immediate retirement of foreign monetary base. It will not have 
any inflationary effects for the foreign country since the newly 
created currency never actually circulates. 
In operational terms, we propose that the central banks 
8 
joining the EMS make a formal commitment to provide each other 
with potentially unlimited, short term lines of credit, if under 
speculative exchange rate pressure. Note that the resolution of 
the European Council establishing the EMS (December 5, 1978) 
already prescribes similar kinds of arrangements. Paragraph 
of this Act reads as follows; "A very short-term facility of 
unlimited amount will be established. Settlements will be made 45 
days after the end of the month of intervention with the 
possibility of prolongation for another three months for amounts 
limited to the size of debtor quotas in the short term monetary 
support". Our proposal, therefore, simply requires making this 
short term facility automatic, and a credible commitment of the 
national central banks to provide and use (if necessary) such a 
credit line. 
Credibi1ity 
If the potential speculators believe that this arrangement is 
operative they will not attack. Thus, a smooth functioning of 
this agreement requires its credibility. Note that, up to now, we 
have not identified any costs of participating in the agreement, 
but only benefits. It may seem,therefore, that a rational central 
banker will always be willing to enter this kind of arrangement. 
However, this plan, as any other, involves potential risks. These 
risks are related to the incentive that a borrower has to 
9 
repudiate her debts and to request lines of credit when nc,t 
eligible= While we think that repudiation of debt obligations 
among EMS country is not a serious threat, the second problem 
deserves sc,me discussion. High debt countries, in fact, may have 
an incentive to claim to be under speculative attack and use the 
lines of credit to finance their deficit, thus imposing 
inflationary pressures c,n the lending cc,Lmti-ies= If the 
governments of these countries lack the necessary political 
credibility to commit to the arrangement, other countries may 
refuse to lend to them. This problem could be avoided if 
speculative attacks could be unambiguously identified, for example 
by indicators like the rate of depletion of international 
reserves. But even if verification were impossible, results from 
the reputational literature suggests that these type of cheating 
may nc,t c,ccur" A Central Bank that employs this kind of strategy 
arid break the intei-national agreement suffe,-s a loss in its 
economic welfare and political reputation. 
In principle, explicit sanctions could be prescribed against 
countries which violate the arrangement. In practice, however, it 
may be hard to reconcile these sanctions with the sovereignty of 
each individual country. A more relevant source of reputational 
costs is related to the future economic consequences of the 
decision of breaking the agreement. If a Central Bank cheats and 
it is expelled from the system for some time, she will not be able 
to take advantage of the benefits of the agreement. In 
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particular, she wi 11 not be able to bon-ow if subject to a real 
speculative attack. In general, a Central Bank will value more 
this loss of reputation: Ci) the less the Central Bank discounts 
the future; (ii) the longer the Central Bank expects to be 
prevented from reentering the system; (iii) the more likely it is 
that this Central Bank will need a line of credit in the future; 
(iv) the more risk averse the Central Bank is. 
Moreover, independence from the fiscal authorities (which 
seem to be increasing) may greatly reduce the Central Bank~s 
incentives to cheat, by breaking the link between budget decisions 
and seigniorage decisions. But what if governments are 
politically unable to commit themselves and these reputational and 
economic costs are not perceived to be sufficient to discourage 
the cheating? Can we still guarantee the feasibility of the 
agreement? In this case our proposal should include a (possibly) 
more radical prescription which, however, is perfectly in the 
spirit of the original Act establishing the EMS. This will 
require an active role of the European Monetary Fund (EMF>, an 
institution that has been missing for too long. If a Central Bank 
decides to invoke the lines of credit, during the period of 
exchange rate emergency it will have to automatically surrender 
its autonomy, and act under the supervision of the EMF. h1 this 
way, the lines of credit could be directly monitored by the lender 
countries, thus avoiding the moral hazard problem. We think that 
this point should be given serious thought since, by assigning to 
11 
the EMF the partial function of lender of last resort (even if for 
limited contingencies>, it would practically create the embryo of 
an European Central Bank. This will represent an important step 
toward a real European monetary unification. 
Cc,nclusic,ns 
In this note we make the following proposal for the EMS. The 
Central Banks of the member countries should make a formal 
commitment to provide each other with potentially unlimited, short 
run lines of credit, if under speculative exchange rate pressure. 
The member banks should agree on a clear set of contingencies 
which triggers these lines of credit, and the possibility of 
monitoring the parties involved with these credit lines should be 
granted. These short term lines of credit should not be used to 
avoid necessary realignments of parities, but simply to allow the 
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